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NOTES
THE MUNICIPALITY, SECTION 1983 AND PENDENT
JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed with the purpose of
providing a civil remedy for acts of state and local officials which
amount to the deprivation of an individual's rights as provided for in
the Constitution and laws of the federal government.' In Monroe v.
Pape,' the Supreme Court put "teeth" into the Civil Rights Act by
holding that police officers, acting in their capacity as police officers but
in violation of state law, were acting "under color of law." The civil
remedy provided by Section 1983 was intended to supplement the state
remedies available to persons whose constitutional rights are violated by
state and local officials.8
Theoretically, then, a person has two causes of action when a police
officer, acting in violation of state law, deprives him of his constitutional
rights. Each action, however, is quite different. The state cause of action
may arise from the statute violated or from the common law tort
principles which provide compensatory damages for that wrong.4 The
joinder of the municipality under the doctrine of respondeat superior is
then permitted in many jurisdictions.' A cause of action is also available
for the recovery of punitive as well as compensatory damages under
Section 1983.6
When dealing with the joinder of state claims in actions brought
under Section 1983, the important federal procedural device of pendent
jurisdiction is brought into issue. The use of pendent jurisdiction pre-
viously has been limited generally to claims between the same parties.!
1. Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (Codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964)) [hereinafter referred to as Section 1983].
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 169
(1967) ; City of Lexington v. Yank, 431 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1968).
5. Id.
6. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963). When actions are brought
in both the federal and state courts, the recovery of compensatory damages in one suit
may preclude a recovery for compensatory damages in the other. This issue of res
judicata, however, is beyond the scope of this note.
7. See, e.g., Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259
F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Gautreau v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 255 F.
Supp. 615 (E.D. La. 1966).
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When a plaintiff joins any state claims he may have against a city
employee with the Section 1983 claim in federal court, the court will
likely exercise pendent jurisdiction and decide all the claims.' But
because of the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape,' stating
that a city is not a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983, the
attempt to join the municipality through the doctrine of respondeat
superior as a co-defendant in either the Section 1983 or the state claim
has not met with much success in federal courts." Without the munici-
pality as a defendant in federal court there may not be a financially
responsible defendant as Monroe pointed out. This leaves the state
courts as the sole forum for holding a municipality liable for the wrongful
acts of its officials. The purpose of this note is to suggest that the federal
courts do have the power through pendent jurisdiction to join a muni-
cipality under the state claim only in a suit against a police officer for
relief under both Section 1983 and state claims.
LIABILITY OF POLICE OFFICERS UNDER SECTION 1983
The civil remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights has existed
since 1871 when the Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which today
is known as Section 1983. This Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
This remedy was given substantial vitality by the Supreme Court in the
decision in Monroe v. Pape.1
The Monroe case involved an action against thirteen Chicago police
officers and the city of Chicago under Section 1983. Mr. Monroe alleged
8. See, e.g., Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969) ; Roberts v. Williams.
302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Rue v. Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn.
1966).
9. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
10. See Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969).
11. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965) ; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of
Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486 (1969); Comment, Tort Liability of Law
Enforcement Officers Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 30 LA. L. REv. 100
(1969).
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that the police officers broke into his home and made his family stand
nude in the middle of the living room as the officers ransacked the house.
He was then held on open charges for ten hours, questioned in con-
nection with a ten day old murder and subsequently released. Mr. Monroe
filed suit in federal court against the police officers for their violation of
Section 1983. The complaint, however, was dismissed by the district
court and the circuit court of appeals affirmed. 2 The Supreme Court,
in reversing the dismissal of the complaint as to the police officers, held
that even though the plaintiff had a cause of action against the police
officers under Illinois law, he should not be precluded from a Section
1983 action. The Court, quoting United States v. Classic,'" stated:
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law, is action taken "under color of" state
law.' 4
The Monroe Court felt that the officers had indeed acted "under color
of state law." This decision has brought about an increase in successful
suits against individual police officers for misuse of their office."5
The Supreme Court limited the impact of the Monroe decision by
refusing to consider a municipality a "person" within the meaning of
Section 1983. The plaintiff had argued that the city of Chicago should
be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts of its
police officers which violated Section 1983."8 The Court's interpretation
hinged on legislative debates prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act. These indicated that Congress did not feel they had the power to
legislate municipal liability for the acts of city officials.1" The Monroe
12. 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959).
13. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). See 15 VAND. L. REv. 267 (1961).
14. 313 U.S. at 326. This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The Court in the Classic and Screws cases dealt
with 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart to Section 1983; the Court felt that the
criteria applied to civil liability should be the same.
15. See Ginger & Bell, Police Mlisconduct Litigation-Plaintiff's Remedies, 15
Am. JUR. TRIALS 555, 579-91 (1968), for a comprehensive compilation of successful
litigation brought against police officers under Section 1983 from 1950 through 1966.
16. Summary of Brief for Appellant at 5 L. Ed. 2d 1052, Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961).
17. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961). Justice Douglas did not
express the Court's opinion on this subject but stated:
Nor do we reach the constitutional question whether Congress has the power to
make municipalities liable for acts of its officers that violate the civil rights of
individuals.
Id. at 191.
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decision clearly leaves any alteration of municipal liability in a Section
1983 action to Congress.
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
The concept of municipal immunity for the tortious acts of its agents
was well ingrained in the American legal system at the promulgation of
the Civil Rights Act in 1871."8 This concept remained judicially intact
until 1958 when the Florida Supreme Court, in Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach,9 became the first state court to abolish the distinction
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions in determining the
liability of the municipality for the tortious acts of its officials. "Govern-
mental" functions are generally considered to be those which are imposed
upon a municipality by law.20 The performance of these functions in a
tortious manner did not impose liability on the municipality.2 ' The
exercise of "proprietary" functions, or those which might as easily be
exercised by a private business, did impose liability on municipalities
when performed in a tortious manner.2
The trend since the Hargrove decision has been to abolish the concept
of municipal immunity for the tortious acts of its agents.2 8 Indiana, one
of the more recent jurisdictions to abandon the concept of municipal
immunity, held that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no proper
place in the administration of a municipal corporation."2 4 In Brinkman
v. City of Indianapolis,25 a police officer had been summoned to assist
Brinkman, who was quite ill, to the hospital. The officer agreed to do so.
Once outside Brinkman's house the officer arrested him for drunken-
ness, being a disorderly person, and having a pre-mental condition.
Bail was not allowed that evening, and Brinkman died that night. An
18. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1872).
19. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
20. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., City of Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So. 2d 825 (1946).
23. See Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. App. 2d 211, 350 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) ; Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11,
163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 231 N.E.2d
169 (1967) ; Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Williams v. City of
Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.,
264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W2d 795 (1962); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162
A.2d 820 (1960); Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265,
154 N.E.2d 534 (1958); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) ;
Dakin, Municipal Immunity in Police Torts, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 448 (1967).
See also Note, Municipal Immunity for the Torts of Police Officers in South Dakota,
11 S.D.L. REV. 87 (1966).
24. Brinkman v. City, of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 665, 231 N.E.2d 169, 172
(1967).
25. Id. at 662, 231 N.E.2d 169.
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autopsy revealed that death was caused by pneumonia and severe con-
gestion of both lungs. The trial court dismissed the city of Indianapolis
as a party defendant on the theory of municipal immunity. The Indiana
Appellate Court, in reversing, held that a municipality is liable for the
torts of a police officer when the relationship of master-servant exists.
The liability rests on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 6 The Supreme
Court of Indiana supported the Brinkman holding by applying it to an
action against a county based on negligent bridge construction."? The
county was held liable for the torts of its officers under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.
2 8
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not place absolute liability
upon a municipality for the tortious acts of its police officers. When a
police officer acts outside the scope of his employment in the furtherance
of his own purposes, the master-servant relationship ceases to exist.2"
Although a person may succeed in a Section 1983 suit against a police
officer, if the theory of respondeat superior does not apply in any state
claims arising from the same occurrence, there can be no recovery from
the municipality on the state claims.8" Some states have clarified the
liability of municipalities through codification by the legislature,"' and
others have legislatively protected the municipal immunity doctrine.3
A person with a Section 1983 claim against a police officer as a
result of the Monroe decision is left to pursue only state remedies against
the municipality. The state remedies may be sought against the police
officer and the municipality where the theory of respondeat superior
applies. 3 Therefore, in order to get complete relief, a plaintiff may be
forced to bring two suits in separate courts for injuries sustained in one
occurrence. The state claims against the police officer may be brought in
26. Id.
27. Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs of County of Miami, -Ind.-, 239 N.E.2d
160 (1968).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., City of Lexington v. Yank, 431 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1968).
30. The Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape found police officers acted "under
color of law" even though their acts violated state law. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that when a police officer violates the law, the master-servant relationship
is broken and the municipality is not liable for such acts. City of Lexington v. Yank,
431 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1968).
31. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 810-996.6 (West 1966); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§
1-101-10-101 (1965).
32. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 69-301 (1967), which limited liability of the
municipality to "neglect to perform, or improper or unskilled performance of their
ministerial duties . . ." The statute goes on to state in § 69-307 that "[a] municipal
corporation shall not be liable for the torts of policemen or other officers engaged in
the discharge of the duties imposed on them by law."
33. See notes 24, 29 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
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either the federal court or state court," but claims against the munici-
pality lack federal jurisdiction and may be brought in the state court.
The defendant police officer, as a result, may be forced to defend two
suits in separate courts arising from the same occurrence.
PENDENT JURISDICTION OF STATE CLAIMS
The Constitution, in article III, section 2, grants to the federal courts
jurisdiction over claims "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority . . . ." The federal courts have been hesitant to deal in
cases arising solely under state law, except where Congress or the
Constitution has expressly granted jurisdiction. 5 The Supreme Court
recognized, however, that non-federal issues which are ancillary to the
federal claim could all be considered in one judicial proceeding in the
federal court. 8 The concept of permitting the joinder of a state claim
with a federal claim in a federal court is known as pendent jurisdiction.
This concept has become more clearly defined through a number of
Supreme Court decisions.
The Supreme Court has not limited the power to exercise pendent
jurisdiction to merely ancillary, non-federal claims. In Siler v. Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Co.,"7 the Court decided that when a federal claim
involving a constitutional issue and a state claim were present in the
pleadings, the federal court could decide the case on the state claim
without reaching the merits on the federal claim. 8 The Court did require,
however, that the constitutional claim be colorable and made in good
faith. 9
The Supreme Court in Hurn v. Oursler0 attempted to clarify the
factors to be considered in determining a federal court's power to exercise
pendent jurisdiction over state claims. The plaintiff in Hum alleged
34. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). This section permits federal jurisdiction of state
claims between parties of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000.
36. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
37. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
38. Id. In the Siler case, the railroad claimed that they had been deprived of
their property without due process of law in the setting of rates by the State Railroad
Commission. The railroad also alleged that the Commission acted in excess of its
delegated authority for setting all intrastate railroad rates. The Supreme Court held
that the Commission had acted in excess of its delegated state power and ignored the
constitutional question even though the Kentucky Supreme Court had not yet ruled
on the question.
39. Id.
40. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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that the defendant's play had violated copyright laws by adopting original
ideas from the plaintiff's copyrighted play. A state common law claim of
unfair business practice was also alleged. The Supreme Court held that
where there is a substantial federal question, the Court has pendent
jurisdiction over the state claims arising out of a "single cause of action."
The Court stated:
The distinction to be observed is between a case where two
distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are
alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a
case where two separate and distinct causes of action are
alleged, one only of which is federal in character."
The Court made it clear that the federal cause of action must be sub-
stantial before the federal courts have jurisdiction over a state cause of
action. 2
The Hum decision was enacted into law by Congress in 1948,
thereby codifying the power of pendent jurisdiction in federal copyright,
patent or trademark cases over common law claims of unfair competi-
tion.4" The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been made effective
in 1938." The passage of the statute and introduction of the Rules
caused uncertainty as to the status of pendent jurisdiction in federal
courts." The Hun decision defined the power to exercise pendent
jurisdiction in terms of "causes of action," but the Federal Rules
abolished this terminology and couched its pleading guidelines in terms
of "claims for relief." ' This confusion was not resolved until 1965 when
the Supreme Court decided the case of United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs." In Gibbs the Court redefined the tests for determining the
existence of the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction in light of the
Federal Rules.
Gibbs sued the United Mine Workers of America under Section
41. Id. at 246. See generally Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of
Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962).
42. Levering S. Garigues Co. v. Morin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933). In Morin the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was interfering with interstate commerce and was in
violation of federal antitrust acts. He also alleged a common law count of conspiracy.
The Court held the federal claim was not substantial and therefore refused jurisdiction
of the state claim.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
44. Effective September 16, 1938.
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18-20.
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
47. 383 U.S. 715 (1965). See Note, U.M.W. v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction,
81 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1968).
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303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.48 He also sought
to join a state claim under the common law of Tennessee for conspiracy
to interfere with the employment contract held by Gibbs with the local
mine owners. The Supreme Court held that the power existed to join
these claims in the federal court and also fashioned the guidelines for
determining the federal power to exercise pendent jurisdiction.
The Court held that the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction
exists whenever "the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional 'case.' " The Court pointed out that one "constitutional"
case exists when both claims "derive from a common nucleus of opera-
tive fact,""0 and "if considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding .... ""
Once it is determined that the state and federal claims are related
in such a manner that they could be tried in one judicial proceeding, the
Supreme Court pointed out that exercise of pendent jurisdiction is
discretionary. The Court felt that in determining whether or not to
exercise its discretion a court should consider "judicial economy, con-
venience, and fairness to the parties."52 These considerations were
further qualified by the comment that "[n]eedless decisions of state
law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to provide a sure-
footed reading of applicable law."53 However, the Court explained that
[t]here may . . . be situations in which the state claim is so
closely tied to questions of federal policy that the argument for
exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong."
A court need not determine the issue of pendent jurisdiction at any
particular state of the litigation. The Court pointed out that
48. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964). Gibbs had an employment contract to haul coal to
the nearest railroad. Gibbs was not permitted to fulfill either contract because of violence
which resulted from a labor dispute that prevented the opening of the mine.
49. 383 U.S. at 725.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 383 U.S. at 726. See Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949) (con-
curring opinion, Magruder, C.J.).
53. 383 U.S. at 726 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 90 S. Ct.
1207 (1970). In Rosado the federal district court interpreted a New York welfare
statute after a three-judge district panel determined the constitutional issue to be moot
304 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). The Court of Appeals held that this was an abuse
of the judge's discretion. 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals and found that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction was proper,
citing the Gibbs criteria. See also Note, Discretionary Factors in the Exercise of
Pendent Jurisdiction: A Setback in the Second Circuit, 64 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 557 (1969).
54. 383 U.S. at 727.
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[t]he question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the
pleadings. But the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has been
properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the
litigation.5
The application of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in federal
court under Section 1983 has been limited to state claims against the
defendant police officer arising out of the same occurrence which gave
rise to the Section 1983 claim.5" Efforts in federal court to join the
municipality to the Section 1983 claims under the theory of respondeat
superior have met with no success because of the decision in Monroe
v. Pape.5" Since a municipality is not a "person" within the context of
Section 1983, the argument that a municipality through pendent juris-
diction may be joined under respondeat superior to the Section 1983
claim was rejected in the Sixth Circuit case of Patrum v. City of
Greensburg.5" A Tennessee district court in McArthur v. Pennington"
had previously agreed with the result in Monroe regarding the municipal
immunity from Section 1983, but held the city liable because it had
purchased liability insurance. The court felt that the city had waived its
immunity."' The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was not persuaded by
the McArthur case. The court did not find any difference between joining
a municipality under the theory of respondeat superior to a Section
1983 claim by using pendent jurisdiction, and directly suing the mu-
nicipality under Section 1983.1
While pendent jurisdiction may not be used to join the municipality
as a defendant under a Section 1983 claim, pendent jurisdiction may be
used to join the state claims against the police officer and also the
municipality under respondeat superior. Pendent jurisdiction has been
used frequently to join state claims against a police officer along with a
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969) (wrongful death)
Roberts v. Williams, 302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (assault and battery,
negligence and false imprisonment) ; Rue v. Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1966)
(unlawful arrest and imprisonment).
57. See notes 8, 10 and 17 supra and accompanying text.
58. Patrum v. Martin, 292 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Ky. 1968), affd sub nom.,
Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct.
1125 (1970).
59. 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
60. Id. The McArthur case has not been followed. While the court came to the
conclusion which the appellant in Patrum desired, the decision did not discuss pendentjurisdiction or explain the liability in the light of the rationale of Monroe v. Pape.
The McArthur case stands alone.
61. Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969).
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Section 1983 claim arising from the same occurrence. 2 The possibility
of joining a municipality under the theory of respondeat superior on
the pendent state claim, absent any independent grounds for federal
jurisdiction of the municipality, is feasible because of the recent expansion
of the concept of pendent jurisdiction."
PENDENT PARTIES
The federal courts have had considerable difficulty in clearly de-
fining the extent to which pendent jurisdiction may be applied to join
parties over which the court has no independent basis for federal juris-
diction. The Supreme Court's criteria for pendent jurisdiction permits
the joinder of claims which derive from a "common nucleus of operative
fact."6 The application of pendent jurisdiction of parties has been
attempted in two situations: 1) those in which two or more plaintiffs
have claims against two or more defendants arising from the same
occurrence, but one or more of the plaintiffs have only a state law claim
against the defendants; 2) those in which one or more plaintiffs have
claims against one or more defendants arising from the same occurrence,
but there is no federal jurisdiction over one or more of the defendants.
Some courts have flatly stated that pendent jurisdiction of non-federal
claims requires the same parties as the federal claim.65 There is, however,
authority to the contrary.66
The first category mentioned has met with considerably more
success than the second in obtaining pendent jurisdiction of non-federal
claims in the federal court. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hat-
ridge," the plaintiff husband brought a suit for personal injuries in
federal court obtaining jurisdiction by asserting diversity of citizenship
with a claim exceeding $10,000.00." The court exercised pendent juris-
62. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
63. The joinder of a party in a federal suit in which there is no independent
federal jurisdiction of that party, and the claim for or against that party arose out of
the same occurrence as the federal claim, is known as the joinder of pendent parties.
See generally Note, U.M.W. v. Gibbs and Pcndent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REv.
657 (1968).
64. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
65. See Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259 F. Supp.
624 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Gautreau v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 255 F. Supp. 615
(E.D. La. 1966). There is no basis in the Gibbs opinion which would substantiate such
a conclusion.
66. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hatridge, 282 F. Supp. 604
(W.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) ; Jacobson v. Atlantic City
Hospital, 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968); Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp.
265 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
67. 282 F. Supp. 604 (W.D. Ark. 1968), affd, 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
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diction by joining the wife's claim of less than $10,000.00 for loss
of consortium.69 In Bishop v. Byrne" a husband sought to litigate his
claim for hospital expenses with an action by his wife for negligence in
the performance of a sterilization operation. The court exercised pendent
jurisdiction noting that his claim should "be litigated as subsidiary to
the wife's claim . . .. ""' This type of suit is a particularly strong case
for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, since the state claim of one
spouse is dependent upon the success of the other spouse's federal
claim.
The Ninth Circuit case of Hymer v. Chai2 is, however, authority
against this proposition. In that case a wife's claim for loss of con-
sortium was not allowed to be asserted with her husband's claim for
personal injuries. Relying on a pre-Gibbs case,7" the court concluded
that the failure to meet the jurisdictional amount, even though there was
diversity, would defeat her attempt for a federal forum."' The use of
pre-Gibbs decisions in determining whether the power to exercise pendent
jurisdiction exists is of questionable validity.75 Unfortunately, the issue
of judicial power to exercise pendent jurisdiction is seldom finally deter-
69. In Hatridge the husband was injured in a bus accident, and the wife's claim
under Arkansas law was contingent on the success of his claim. The court found the
claims so intertwined and interdependent that pendent jurisdiction was allowed. The
court cited the Gibbs case as supportive of its conclusion.
70. 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967).
71. Id. at 466.
72. 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
73. Katooka v. May Dep't Stores Co., 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940). The court
found that a plaintiff who sued two defendants as joint tort-feasors, one of whom was
from the same state as she, would not support federal jurisdiction because of the lack
of complete diversity.
74. The court in the Hatridge case was aware of the Hymer decision but chose
to ignore it. See also Campbell v. City of Atlanta, 277 F. Supp 395 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
A man brought suit in federal court for personal injuries suffered when the city's
bridge collapsed as his truck was crossing. His wife brought suit in a state court for
loss of consortium in the amount of $9,999.99. The defendant city sought to remove the
wife's claim to the federal court. Jurisdiction was refused in the exercise of the court's
discretion. The court noted that determination of either claim was not res judicata as
to the other. There were also other issues which clouded the husband's claim, includingjoinder of the husband's employer in a counterclaim on the theory of respondeat superior.
The employer counterclaimed against the city for damage to the truck. The court went
on to state:
But for these circumstances, and in the ordinary case it may well be that the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction should be extended to cases of this character
in the interest of judicial economy and convenience. Certainly such a con-
clusion would seem to be in keeping with the spirit of the Federal Rules
relating to joinder of claims and parties [See FED. R. Cxv. P. 18-20]. We
find no authority, however, for such an extension under the precise facts
of this case, and we decline to order or to recognize one until sanctioned by
higher authority.
277 F. Supp. at 396-97.
75. See 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 18.07, at 1953 (2d ed. 1969).
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mined in many cases because the court merely exercises its discretion in
the alternative by dismissing the pendent party."' This method makes
review of the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction of parties in the
circuit courts difficult.
In a situation similar to that of the Hatridge and Hymer cases,
the District Courts of the Third Circuit have also refused to invoke
pendent jurisdiction. A minor in Pennsylvania who has a personal
injury claim against a resident of the state may have a guardian-ad-litem
from another state appointed to represent him in court, thus creating
diversity of citizenship. If the claim exceeds $10,000.00, the minor may
litigate the claim in federal court."' Newman v. Freeman"8 and Obney v.
Schmalzreid9 were two cases which allowed a parent to join a claim for
less than $10,000.00, even though no diversity of citizenship existed,
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. A three-judge district court
in Oliveri v. Adams,"0 however, refused to follow these decisions even
though they were factually the same. The Oliveri court pointed out that
although a parent's claim is derivative of the child's claim, when an out-
of-state guardian is appointed, the relationship of parent-child is broken.
The Oliveri case distinguished the Third Circuit's decision in Wilson v.
American Chain & Cable Co.,"1 by noting that in the Wilson case the
father's claim for loss of services which was joined to the child's personal
injury claim was permitted because the father was the guardian-plaintiff,
leaving only one plaintiff with multiple causes of action.
The cases which have allowed the joinder of pendent parties are not
limited to joinder of plaintiffs' claims but are supplemented by those
which have allowed the joinder of a state claim against a non-federal
defendant. The joinder of a third party defendant in some federal courts
has permitted the plaintiff to sue that party directly on a state claim,"2
76. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ; Meyerhoffer v.
East Hanover Twp. School Dist., 280 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Pa. 1968).
77. Oliveri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See 66 MICH. L. Riv.
373 (1966).
78. 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In that case a father's claim for medical
expenses and loss of services was allowed to be joined with a minor's action for injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. See also Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co.,
364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966), where a father's claim for incidental damages was
permitted to be joined with his suit for his minor child's injuries sustained from a
power lawnmower.
79. 273 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967). In that case the parent's claim for medical
expenses was permitted to be joined with a minor's claim for injuries suffered in an
automobile accident.
80. 280 F. Supp. 428 (F.D. Pa. 1968).
81. 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966). See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
82. Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968). This
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but this procedure has not met with wide acceptance. 8 One of the
chief concerns in litigating state claims of any kind in federal courts is
the already heavy caseload of the federal courts.8 4 This is an important
factor in the reluctance of the federal courts to permit the joinder of
pendent parties.
The concept of pendent jurisdiction was applied in Jacobson v.
Atlantic City Hospital5 to join a defendant over which the court had no
independent federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff sued two doctors and the
hospital for negligence in federal court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. A state statute limited the liability of the hospital to
$10,000.00.s8 This limitation of liability prevented the plaintiff from
joining the defendant on the basis of diversity of citizenship since the
amount in controversy was not sufficient.17 The hospital was joined
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in a suit in federal court
against the doctors. The court held that the negligence of the doctors
and the hospital operated concurrently to produce the death of plaintiff's
intestate. The court exercised pendent jurisdiction reasoning that:
[M]ost of the operative facts are common to the coupled
claims, and in normal and most convenient and expeditious
practice and procedure these claims would be tried together.88
The rationale of Jacobson has been persuasive in subsequent cases
which have permitted the joinder of a defendant when the court does not
have independent federal jurisdiction. One such case cited the phraseology
of Gibbs in allowing such joinder, pointing out that the claims arose
from, "a common nucleus of operative fact" and "are such that
he [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding."8 9
decision pointed out that a third party defendant may directly sue the plaintiff absent
independent federal jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
83. See Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa.
1969). An employee sued his employer under the F.E.L.A. The employer joined a
crossing guard as a third-party defendant, but the employee was not permitted to
directly sue the guard. See also Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473
(W.D. Pa. 1969); Corbi v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Pa. 1969);
Palumbo v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 271 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1967).
84. Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
85. 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968). See Note, Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital:
Liberalizing the Amount of Controversy Requirements of Federal Diversity Juris-
diction for Multiple Defendant Cases, 30 U. Pirr. L. REv. 413 (1968).
86. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:53A-7, 8 (1951).
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1966).
88. 392 F.2d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1968).
89. Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1968). See also McCormick & Co.
v. Redford Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 29, 35 (D. Md. 1969).
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Other federal courts have been reluctant to exercise their discretion
in permitting the joinder of pendent parties."0 The decisions do ,not
show much consistency in legal reasoning, thus leaving some confusion
in the area of pendent parties. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
decided whether pendent parties may be joined, the Court has indicated
that pendent jurisdiction is important in settling the entire dispute
between parties when there is a substantial federal question involved.
In Rosado v. Wyman,"' the Court decided that even though the federal
question had become moot, the district court had the power to decide
the state claims involved. The Court felt that federal-state comity was
not as important as conserving judicial energy and avoiding multiplicity
of litigation. The Rosado decision was important because the guidelines
for exercising discretion were clarified. Judicial economy and avoidance
of multiple litigation seemed to be the primary factors to be considered.
These guidelines may become more important in future decisions regard-
ing pendent parties.
The federal courts since the United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs"' decision have not been as reluctant to join pendent parties as they
were in pre-Gibbs cases. Unfortunately, however, the pre-Gibbs decisions
sometimes influence post-Gibbs decisions regarding pendent jurisdic-
tion."3 The court in the Patrum v. City of Greensburg decision cited the
case of Wotias v. Village of Niles"4 as supporting the conclusion that
retaining the city as a party without separate federal jurisdiction was not
proper. The Wotias case, however, was decided in 1964 before the Gibbs
guidelines were decided by the Supreme Court. In Wotfas a suit was
filed under Section 1983 against city officials. State claims against the
city were not permitted to be joined, even though they arose from the
same fact situation. The guidelines for determining the power to exercise
pendent jurisdiction set out in Gibbs may very well have caused the
Wotias case to have been decided differently.95 This decision should not
90. Kletscka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); Ellicott Machine Corp. v.
Wiley Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Md. 1969); Sayre v. United States, 282 F.
Supp. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
91. 90 S. Ct. 1207 (1970). This decision was foreshadowed by federal district
court decisions which held that "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to parties"
is controlling in determining whether to decide state claims which are local in nature.
Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Travers v. Patton,
261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966).
92. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
93. 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 18.07, at 1953 (2d ed. 1969).
94. 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964).
95. See Note, Discretionary Factors in the Exercise of Pendent Jurisdiction: A
Setback in the Second Circuit, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 557, 562-63 (1969). This article
analyzes how Wotias v. Village of Niles might have been decided under the Gibbs
guidelines.
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stand in the way of permitting a city to be joined as a party on state
claims in a Section 1983 suit against one of its officials where the
Gibbs guidelines are satisfied.
CONCLUSION
Pendent jurisdiction may be the basis which will provide com-
plete relief to a party whose civil rights have been violated. In 1871
Congress saw the need to provide a civil remedy for the violation
of civil rights by passing Section 1983. In so doing, however, Congress
did not attempt to abrogate municipal immunity even though there was
feeling among its members that the municipality should be responsible
for the acts of municipal officials. 6 Not until 1958 were the courts
willing to remove the common law cloak of immunity from the mu-
nicipality for tortious acts of its employees. 7 Since that time, many other
states have followed suit in abolishing this common law concept.9" A
person who has had his civil rights violated by a police officer and brings
a suit under Section 1983 may join any state claims he has against the
officer under pendent jurisdiction. 9 The newly developing concept of
pendent parties should permit the municipality as the employer to be
joined as a defendant to the state claims under the theory of respondeat
superior.'"
The power of a federal court to exercise pendent jurisdiction exists
when both the state and federal claims arise out of a "common nucleus
of operative facts" and are of a nature which ordinarily would be tried in
one judicial proceeding."' When a police officer violates a person's civil
rights, the Section 1983 action and all state claims against the munici-
pality and the officer arise from that incident. Once the state claims
against the officer are proved in federal court, only the agency question
remains to be determined in the state claim against the municipality." 2
The Gibbs and Rosado decisions held that once the power to exercise
pendent jurisdiction exists, the court should consider avoidance of
multiplicity of litigation, judicial economy and convenience of the parties
96. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital, 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) ; Stone
v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); McCormick & Co. v. Redford Industries, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 29 (D. Md. 1969).
101. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 27, 52 and 53 supra and accompanying text. The possibility that the
jury will confuse the issues must also be considered.
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in determining whether to exercise its discretion and permit the joinder
of state claims.
The possibilities of suits in both federal and state courts on a set of
facts giving rise to a cause of action against a police officer under Section
1983 and also state claims against the officer and the municipality are the
result of the supplemental nature of the Section 1983 recovery."' Since
plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for compensatory damages for his
injuries, judicial economy and avoidance of multiplicity of litigation would
be accomplished by permitting a plaintiff to try all of his claims in the
federal court."°4 If both the federal and state claims are tried in one
proceeding, the defendant police officer would be convenienced by
defending in only the federal court rather than both the state and federal
courts. "' This result should promote fairness to both the plaintiff and
defendant police officer by determining all claims in one proceeding. Of
course, the municipality is defending only against the state claims and
therefore should not be prejudiced by being required to defend in the
federal court.
A case such as Patrum v. City of Greensburg' would appear to be
a proper case for a plaintiff to join a Section 1983 claim with all state
claims against a police officer and also join the city on the state claims.
The exercise of a federal court's discretion to permit pendent jurisdiction
of these claims would allow all claims to be adjudicated in one pro-
ceeding."" This result would be a consistent and proper interpretation of
the guidelines for pendent jurisdiction as set out in the Gibbs and Rosado
decisions.' 8
103. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
104. See Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963). The court in that case
permitted only one recovery of compensatory damages where the jury had allowed
recovery of compensatory damages under a Section 1983 claim and also for state tort
claims.
105. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
106. 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969). The plaintiff was allegedly beaten and
falsely imprisoned by a Greensburg, Kentucky police officer.
107. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. See also Shakman, New Pendent
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv. 262 (1968).
108. There is a possibility of claiming punitive damages on the state claims in a
state court. If punitive damages are permitted on the state claims, the result achieved
would be similar to permitting the joinder of a city under a Section 1983 claim. This
topic, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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